The Criminal Code of the Soviet Union contained an article punishing “sodomy,” that is, sexual relations between men. It was used from time to time to persecute political opponents of the Soviet regime, and in general, it was a tool that forced LGBT+ people to avoid coming out and stay underground.
With the collapse of the USSR, 15 newly formed countries inherited this article, and then each of them went its own way. Some countries abolished criminal liability for male homosexuality quickly, some did this only later, and some even transferred it to their own Criminal Code. The trajectories of changes in the legal status of LGBT+ people in these countries as a whole also became different.
At the same time, common past experience, territorial proximity, and political interconnections contributed to the fact that the countries of the former USSR looked at each other when introducing further legislative changes related to LGBT+ people. And since the largest country in the region – both in size and influence – is the Russian Federation, which has begun to prosecute for “LGBT propaganda” and has generally made homophobia a part of its state ideology, it can be assumed that it exactly sets the same homophobic tone for the entire post-Soviet region, and especially for the countries under its strong influence.
Based on this assumption, let us analyze the legislative initiatives of the countries of the former USSR aimed directly at LGBT+ people, focusing on those aimed at restricting their rights. As a result, we will see whether the above hypothesis is true and what general trends in terms of the legal status of LGBT+ people and its dynamics can be found in these countries.
Let us first consider the general legislation regulating the rights of LGBT+ people on the grounds of sexual orientation and/or gender identity. Restrictive laws and legislative initiatives are left out of brackets here, except for legislation that criminalized homosexual relations between men. Since this article of the criminal code was inherited by all independent states formed after the collapse of the USSR, the movement around it in most of them was towards lifting restrictions, not increasing them.
The countries are reviewed here in geographical order from north to south and from west to east – except for the Russian Federation, which is mentioned last.
Criminal liability
Liability for consensual sexual intercourse between men was abolished in 1992, and in 2001, the article on same-sex relations was completely removed from the Criminal Code. In 2002, the age of sexual consent for different-sex and same-sex relations was also equalized.
Same-sex unions
Registered partnerships have been available to same-sex couples in Estonia since 2016, and the law on same-sex marriage was passed in 2023, then has effectively became available from the beginning of the following year. Thus, at the time of writing, Estonia is the only former Soviet country to have achieved marriage equality.
Gender transition
The current procedure does not require sterilization, but requires approval from an expert medical commission and mandatory hormone replacement therapy before legal gender recognition can be obtained. There is also a minimal two-year period between the commission’s diagnostics and legal recognition.
Protection from discrimination
Estonian law prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in employment and vocational training, while the Gender Equality Act prohibits discrimination on the grounds of gender identity in all areas. Public incitement to hatred based on sexual orientation is also prohibited.
Criminal liability
In Latvia, criminal liability for “sodomy” was abolished in 1992. In 1999, the age of consent for same-sex and different-sex relationships was equalized.
Same-sex unions
After repeated attempts over the years, civil partnerships for same-sex couples without adoption and inheritance rights became available in Latvia from July 1, 2024. Marriage has been defined in the Constitution as a union between a man and a woman since the end of 2005.
Gender transition
The transition procedure is generally not clearly regulated, but in practice, it involves at least a mandatory psychiatric diagnosis and medical interventions, the scope of which can be interpreted arbitrarily, including surgical sterilization.
Protection from discrimination
The prohibition of discrimination in Latvia applies to the areas of labor and goods and services only on the grounds of sexual orientation. This is enshrined in the Labor Code and the Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination of Natural Persons – Performers of Economic Activity.
Criminal liability
Sexual contact between men was decriminalized in 1993. In 2003, with the approval of the new Criminal Code, the age of sexual consent for same-sex and different-sex relations was equalized.
Same-sex unions
The Constitution defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman. In 2025, the Constitutional Court legalized civil partnerships by its decision, but legislative regulation for them has not yet been implemented at the time of writing.
Gender transition
For many years, there was no legislation for legal gender recognition in Lithuania, and it was decided by the courts. According to amendments to the legislation in 2022, changing a name became possible without mandatory medical interventions, but with a psychiatric diagnosis, while changing a gender marker still requires a court decision.
Protection from discrimination
Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is prohibited by the Lithuanian Law on Equal Treatment of 2003 in several areas. The Criminal Code also prohibits incitement to violence on the grounds of sexual orientation.
Criminal liability
In 1994, the article establishing such liability for homosexual relations between men was removed from the Criminal Code. At the same time, criminal liability for “sodomy” and “lesbianism” on a par with other acts of a sexual nature is still present there, regarding cases where they are committed against a person under the age of 16.
Same-sex unions
There is no recognition of such unions in Belarus, and marriage is defined in the Constitution as a union between a man and a woman.
Gender transition
The transition procedure in Belarus does not define a fixed amount of mandatory medical interventions, but does require a psychiatric diagnosis and permission from an interdisciplinary medical commission.
Protection from discrimination
None.
Criminal liability
In 1991, Ukraine was the first country in the former USSR to abolish criminal liability for consensual same-sex relations between men. In 2001, the article on “sodomy” was completely removed from the updated Criminal Code. The age of sexual consent in Ukraine was only legally established in 2018, equal for different-sex and same-sex relationships.
Same-sex unions
Although the issue of a recognition of registered civil partnerships has been raised at the state level since 2015, it has not progressed beyond draft laws at the time of writing. At the same time, the Constitution defines marriage as one that is “based on the free consent of a woman and a man.”
Gender transition
The transition procedure that has been in effect since 2016 includes a psychiatric diagnosis and hormone replacement therapy as mandatory prerequisites for legal gender recognition.
Protection from discrimination
The Labor Code prohibits discrimination on the grounds of SOGI. Discrimination on these grounds is also prohibited in the military service, and the Law on Media prohibits incitement to discrimination. The Law on Advertising also prohibits discriminatory statements or images and incitement to hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation.
Criminal liability
Such liability for homosexual relations between men was abolished in 1995. In 2002, the age of sexual consent for same-sex and different-sex relations was equalized.
Same-sex unions
There is no recognition of such unions, and the Constitution defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman.
Gender transition
There is no clearly regulated transition procedure in Moldova. In practice, legal gender recognition is based on a court decision and requires a psychiatric diagnosis, but there is no requirement for any medical interventions.
Protection from discrimination
In early 2023, amendments to the Law on Ensuring Equality came into force, which prohibit discrimination on the grounds of SOGI in all spheres of life. A separate prohibition of discrimination in the field of employment on the grounds of sexual orientation also applies. Also, the Criminal Code provides for liability for hate crimes and for incitement to such crimes on the grounds of SOGI since 2022.
Criminal liability
Liability for homosexual relations between men was abolished in 2000 with the introduction of the updated Criminal Code. It also established an equal age of sexual consent for different-sex and same-sex relationships.
Same-sex unions
There is no recognition of such unions in Georgia. In 2018, the definition of marriage was changed to “a union of a man and a woman for the purpose of creating a family,” although previously it was more neutral, referring to equal rights for spouses.
Gender transition
The 2024 Law on Family Values and the Protection of Minors prohibited any medical procedures related to transition, as well as changing gender in identification documents.
Protection from discrimination
Since 2014, Georgia has had the Law on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, which includes SOGIE grounds. The Criminal Code of 2012 also contains provisions on increased liability for hate crimes on the grounds of SOGIE.
Criminal liability
The new Criminal Code, which removed the article on liability for homosexual sex between men, was adopted in 2002 and came into force in 2003. Before that, this article had continued to apply throughout the 1990s. The age of sexual consent is set to be equal for same-sex and different-sex couples.
Same-sex unions
There is no recognition of such unions. Since 2015, the Constitution has contained a definition that “a woman and a man who have reached marriageable age have the right to marry.”
Gender transition
The Civil Code stipulates that changing gender marker is possible on the grounds of “a document of an established form issued by a licensed medical institution.” However, neither this form nor the procedure for obtaining it is regulated by law, making legal gender recognition virtually impossible.
Protection from discrimination
None.
Criminal liability
In 2000, Azerbaijan adopted a new Criminal Code that decriminalized same-sex sexual relations between men. The age of sexual consent was set equal for same-sex and different-sex couples.
Same-sex unions
There is no recognition of such unions. The Constitution does not contain a direct restriction, while noting, “husband and wife have equal rights.”
Gender transition
There is no regulated transition procedure, but there are some known cases where trans people managed to obtain legal gender recognition based on medical documents confirming the surgical intervention on their genitals.
Protection from discrimination
None.
Criminal liability
Such liability for same-sex sexual relations between men was abolished in 1997 in the process of updating the Criminal Code. An equal age of sexual consent was also established for same-sex and different-sex relationships.
Same-sex unions
There is no recognition of such unions. The Constitution also lacks a clear definition of marriage.
Gender transition
The transition procedure since 2011 includes a mandatory diagnosis confirmed by an expert commission, hormone therapy, and surgical sterilization. It is also only available from the age of 21.
Protection from discrimination
None.
Criminal liability
The Criminal Code, which has been in effect since 1994, provides for liability for homosexual relations between men with up to 3 years in prison.
Same-sex unions
There is no recognition. The constitution defines marriage as being based on “traditional family values of the people of Uzbekistan.”
Gender transition
There is no regulated transition procedure. However, the Family Code allows for gender change in the civil status records “only upon the conclusion of health authorities.”
Protection from discrimination
None.
Criminal liability
As amended in 2019, the Criminal Code of Turkmenistan provides for punishment for sexual relations between men up to 2 years in prison and up to 5 years of living in a certain place.
Same-sex unions
There is no recognition. The Constitution states that a man and a woman of marriageable age have the right to marry.
Gender transition
There is no transition procedure as such.
Protection from discrimination
None.
Criminal liability
Liability for “sodomy” was abolished in 1998. The age of sexual consent for same-sex and different-sex relations is set equal.
Same-sex unions
There is no recognition of such unions. Since 2016, the Constitution stipulates that marriage can only be concluded between a man and a woman.
Gender transition
In 2020, access to legal gender recognition was removed from Kyrgyz law. However, medical transition remains possible.
Protection from discrimination
None.
Criminal liability
Such liability for same-sex sexual contact between men was abolished in 1998. The age of sexual consent for same-sex and different-sex couples is set equal.
Same-sex unions
There is no recognition of such unions. The Constitution states that men and women who have reached marriageable age have the right to marry.
Gender transition
There is no regulated transition procedure, although the Civil Code mentions that gender status can be changed upon submission of a “document of the established form” from a medical institution.
Protection from discrimination
None.
Criminal liability
In 1993, the article of the Criminal Code that provided for liability for “sodomy” was abolished, but those previously convicted under it had not been granted amnesty. The age of sexual consent for same-sex and different-sex relations was set equal.
Same-sex unions
There is no recognition. Since 2020, the Constitution has defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman.
Gender transition
In 2023, both legal gender recognition and any medical interventions related to transition were completely banned by law.
Protection from discrimination
None.
We can see a trend that a country’s involvement in European institutions – being a member of the EU, being at a certain stage of its path to such membership, or at least being a member of the Council of Europe – influences the legislative regulation of LGBT+ rights for the better. In particular:
On the other hand, the worst situation with the rights of LGBT+ people is in the countries of Central Asia with de facto dictatorial regimes under the strong influence of Islam – Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where criminal liability for homosexual relations remains today.
Such a pattern is less clearly observed in relation to the rights of transgender people. Thus, none of the countries of the former USSR provides trans people with the opportunity for legal gender recognition by self-determination. At the same time, examples of unregulated transition procedures are seen among European countries as well as countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, although this trend is predominant among the latter.
As for the decriminalization of homosexuality, it took place in the post-Soviet countries in one of two ways:
The first path was taken by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia. Thus, these states paid more focused attention to the decriminalization of homosexuality and, accordingly, did it earlier (in the period 1991–1995), while the rest resorted to such a change as part of a general “update package” of criminal legislation in a later period (late 90s – early 2000s). Again, countries from the European continent are ahead here, although not all of them chose the European path of development later.
We should also note those countries in which the constitutional definition of marriage was changed from a neutral one to “union of a man and a woman” or similar, one way or another, to exclude even the hypothetical possibility of marriage by same-sex couples. These are Latvia, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia – in the last three, this was the result of referendums, where the question on the definition of marriage was included in the set of other proposed amendments to the Constitution. At the same time, the connection between the neutral or “heterosexual” constitutional formulation of marriage and the level of protection of the rights of LGBT+ people is not observed in the remaining countries – in particular, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have a relatively neutral definition, while such protection is absent there.
Now let’s move on to the main topic of the material, namely the review of legislative acts and initiatives aimed at direct or indirect restriction of the rights of LGBT+ people in the countries of the former USSR. We will also review each country separately (however, pointing out the connections between them in promoting such initiatives where they can be found), and then we will try to generalize.
The information for each country is structured as follows:
This time, on the contrary, Russia begins the list of countries, based on the hypothesis that it is the one that sets homophobic and transphobic trends in the region.
Homophobic manifestations at the state level began in Russia in the 2000s. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, they only intensified with the adoption of new laws that increasingly restricted the rights and freedoms of LGBT+ people.
Ban on “LGBT propaganda”
Attempts to ban certain LGBT+ related activities in the Russian Federation have been known since at least 2003. At that time, State Duma deputy Alexander Chuyev proposed supplementing the Criminal Code with an article that would prohibit “propaganda of homosexualism,” which could be expressed, in particular, “in a public demonstration of a homosexual lifestyle and homosexual orientation.” Similar bills were introduced by him three times, but each time they were withdrawn from consideration for formal reasons.
Starting in 2006, some regions of the Russian Federation separately began to adopt at their level laws against “LGBT propaganda” in one form or another. The first was the Ryazan Region in that very 2006 with the law On the Protection of Morality and Health of Children, which banned “propaganda of homosexuality (sodomy and lesbianism) among minors,” providing for fines in case of violation. Then there was a break of several years, after which, since 2011, similar laws were adopted by Arkhangelsk, Kostroma, Magadan regions, St. Petersburg, etc. – a total of 12 regions. It is worth noting among them the St. Petersburg law, adopted in February 2012, due to its impact on the further development of the situation in the Russian Federation. There was a fine imposed for “public actions aimed at promoting sodomy, lesbianism, bisexualism, transgenderism among minors.” The author of the law was Vitaly Milonov, a then-city deputy, who has since become one of the symbolic figures as the embodiment of Russian homophobia.
Discussions on the possibility of banning “propaganda of homosexualism” in the Russian Federation at the federal level began at late 2011, after the St. Petersburg law was adopted in the first reading. Then it took a year and a half to agree on the details and wording, the key figure in which was the head of the State Duma Committee on Family, Women and Children, Elena Mizulina, another odious, homophobic figure. In the form finally adopted in June 2013, the wording was changed to a ban on “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors” – according to Mizulina herself, “as a concession to sexual minorities”. However, on the one hand, this wording was de facto still associated primarily with homosexual relations, and on the other hand, its vagueness left room for its selective and arbitrary application. As a liability for such propaganda, the law provided for different fines for individuals, officials, and legal entities, as well as a significant increase in fines in the case of propaganda using the media, including the Internet.
In 2022, State Duma deputy Alexander Khinshtein proposed a new draft law of a broader scope to replace the one described above. This time, it was about “prohibition of propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations and/or preferences, pedophilia, sex change,” and not only for minors, but in general. The law was adopted at the end of the year.
As for the practice of applying these laws, there were literally isolated cases for regional ones. For federal ones, there were more of them, but they remained very selective and concerned only with individual LGBT+ activists and organizations. However, in addition to direct enforcement, the very existence of a legislative ban on “propaganda” also had indirect consequences for the Russian LGBT+ community:
Restrictions on LGBT+ associations
In 2012, Russia passed a law that introduced the status of “foreign agent” for non-profit organizations that engage in political activities in Russia and receive funding from abroad. In a broad sense, this law was aimed at Russian opposition movements, whose activities were largely supported by funding from foreign sources. It also affected LGBT+ organizations, which mostly operated on grants from foreign donors.
The law initially stipulated that organizations falling under the definition of “foreign agents” must register with the Ministry of Justice and indicate their status in any of their publications, as well as regularly submit reports on their funding from foreign sources and their activities. The legislation was supplemented in subsequent years, expanding both the scope and depth of influence on those recognized as such agents:
As you can see, the status of a “foreign agent” was rather formal at the beginning, but as time went on, it imposed more and more restrictions on activities. At the same time, in the event of the cessation of foreign funding, this status is removed. In practice, according to data for 2021, more than a quarter of the organizations that had it eventually ceased their activities and dissolved themselves.
It is worth noting that a significant strengthening of repressive legislation in Russia has occurred in recent years after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This is not just a coincidence – in particular, the aforementioned Khinshtein, promoting the expansion of the ban on “LGBT propaganda”, noted that “A special military operation takes place not only on the battlefields, but also in the minds of people.” This emphasizes once more the nature of the Russian-Ukrainian war as not just a confrontation between two states, but a civilizational confrontation, in which Ukraine is not only defending itself, but is fighting in general for Western civilization, which has human rights as one of its values – including rights for LGBT+ people.
At the end of 2023, in response to a lawsuit from the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation banned the “international LGBT public movement” as extremist. From a purely legal point of view, this decision is nonsense, since in Russia (and in the whole world), there is no registered organization with such a name that could act as a defendant. Nevertheless, this decision led to a number of detentions during 2024 of LGBT+ activists, as well as visitors to gay clubs and simply people with rainbow symbols (which were interpreted as “symbolism of an extremist organization”).
Thus, this court decision continues the general line of the Russian authorities, which can be called a hybrid persecution of LGBT+ people. On the one hand, the vagueness of the wording allows it to be selectively applied to any LGBT+ related public manifestations, and on the other hand, it increases uncertainty and fear among the LGBT+ community itself, pushing it towards greater closedness.
Other restrictions on rights
In 2023, Russia also banned transition as such. The new law not only abolished the transition procedure that existed before, but also:
Moreover, after the law came into force, there are known individual cases where legal gender recognition granted in previous times was canceled by a court decision. The context of the Russian-Ukrainian war also played a role in the adoption of this law – for example, among the arguments for its adoption was one that changing the sex marker in documents allows men to avoid military conscription and, according to the head of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Bastrykin, “violates the defense capability of the state.”
At the time of writing, Estonia is not only the most progressive country in the post-Soviet space in terms of respecting the rights of LGBT+ people – in particular, the only one where same-sex marriage is available – but also, apparently, the only one where no even partially successful attempts to promote legislative restrictions on such rights are observed.
Other restrictions on rights
The main political confrontation in the LGBT+ context took place in Estonia around the introduction of registered partnerships, and then of marriage equality. Thus, in 2017, the Conservative People’s Party, together with two others, attempted to repeal the Registered Partnerships Act, but the parliamentary majority did not support this initiative.
Also in 2019, the Conservatives, in coalition with the Centrists, promoted an attempt to hold a referendum on same-sex marriage, which, in the event of a negative result, would have included the definition of marriage as a “union of a man and a woman” in the Constitution. However, further debates in the government led to the rejection of the binding nature of the referendum, and in early 2021 – after a change of government due to accusations of corruption against the Center Party – the referendum was abandoned altogether. In 2023, the Conservatives and Centrists also tried to oppose the legislative recognition of same-sex marriage, but without success.
Although Latvia does not reach Estonia’s level of respect for the rights of LGBT+ people, attempts to restrict such rights legislatively have not been quite successful there either.
Ban on “LGBT propaganda”
Back in 2006, Latvia’s First Party proposed a draft law to ban “gay propaganda” in the media. This party was known as the “party of priests” because its founders were actually priests who promoted “Christian values.” Its initiative did not find support in the Seimas and was rejected.
In 2012, Riga Duma deputy and consistent opponent of pride parades, Jānis Šmits, proposed a ban on “propaganda of homosexualism in public places” to make LGBT+ pride parades in the Latvian capital impossible. However, his idea was also rejected by the parliament.
In 2013, the “Sargāsim mūsu bērnus” association, which translates to “Let’s Protect Our Children,” proposed a nationwide referendum on “banning advertising and promotion of same-sex sexual and marital relations among children.” If successful, the activists of this society wanted to introduce a legislative amendment to prohibit the involvement of children as participants or spectators in events aimed at such advertising. If successfully adopted, such a law would allow, in particular, to ban the holding of pride parades. Homophobic activists managed to obtain permission from the Central Election Commission of Latvia to collect signatures necessary for holding a referendum. However, they were unable to collect the minimum required number of 30,000 signatures within the allotted time, and thus their attempt failed.
Other restrictions on rights
In 2005, the aforementioned Latvia’s First Party proposed changing the constitutional definition of marriage to define it as a “union between a man and a woman.” The amendment was adopted in the following year by parliament, making Latvia the first post-Soviet country to make such a deliberate constitutional change, long before Russia did.
In recent years, there were no noticeable banning initiatives, with opponents of LGBT+ equality focusing instead on preventing the introduction of civil partnerships in Latvia. These processes intensified after the 2020 Constitutional Court ruling that ordered the Seimas to provide legal protection for same-sex partners. The parliamentary opposition, in particular the right-wing conservative party Latvia First, based its strategy on the statement that partnerships are a “surrogate for marriage,” while marriage is constitutionally permitted only between a man and a woman. When the draft law on partnerships received enough votes, the opponents again resorted to an attempt to organize a referendum. If successful, it would have overturned the adoption of the law, but they failed to collect the required number of signatures, so the law was signed by the president and soon entered into force.
Despite Lithuania having been an EU member since 2004, strong religious influence on the government led it to be the first of the former Soviet countries to introduce a legislative ban on “LGBT propaganda” at the national level.
Ban on “LGBT propaganda”
In June 2009, the Lithuanian parliament adopted an amendment to the Law on the Protection of Minors against the Detrimental Effect of Public Information, which, among other things, prohibited “propaganda of homosexual, bisexual, and polygamous relations.” The amendment was supported by an overwhelming majority of deputies, who at that time were heavily influenced by the Catholic Church, and its text effectively repeated Section 28 of a similar law in the United Kingdom from 1986, which, however, was repealed in 2003. It is noteworthy that the president of Lithuania vetoed this law not because of a fundamental disagreement, but only because of the “lack of clear definitions,” and his veto was quickly overridden by parliament. Later, the new president Dalia Grybauskaitė opposed this law, but it resulted only in changing the above-mentioned wording to “ban to spread of information that would promote sexual relations or other conceptions of concluding a marriage or creating a family other than established in the Constitution or the Civil Code.” Given the constitutional definition of marriage as “the union of a man and a woman,” this did not change the essence.
The “Law on the Protection of Minors” has been tried to be applied several times – in particular, in attempts to ban pride parades in 2010 and 2013, without success, but more successfully to limit the display of pride-related advertising. Also in 2014, the distribution of a children’s book of fairy tales was banned because, among other things, it included two stories about same-sex relations. The case regarding this ban was referred to the ECtHR, which ruled in 2023 that the Lithuanian government had violated the right to freedom of expression in this case. At the end of 2024, a similar decision was made by the Constitutional Court of Lithuania, which ultimately declared the anti-LGBT+ article of the law unconstitutional.
In addition to the aforementioned law, there were later attempts in Lithuania to restrict rights in the form of a “ban on propaganda” on the grounds of sexual orientation:
– In 2010, an amendment was made to the Public Information Act that, among other things, prohibited “depicting or promoting sexual orientation” in advertising. This wording was later explained as a “translation error” and was removed from the text of the law by a new amendment in 2011.
– In 2011, MP Petras Gražulis proposed a draft law that would make “public propagation of homosexual relations” punishable by a fine. Gražulis was previously associated with the Christian Democrats, and at that time represented the nationalist-conservative Order and Justice party. He is generally known for consistently opposing equal rights for LGBT+ people. At that time, his proposal did not find support in parliament and was quickly rejected. In 2013, in connection with the Baltic Pride, Gražulis again proposed an amendment on fines for organizing public LGBT+ events with the wording “for public denigration of constitutional family values.”
Other restrictions on rights
Since 2013, a number of amendments restricting the rights of LGBT+ people have been submitted to the parliament: a ban on medical interventions related to transition; a ban on adoption by same-sex couples; exemption from liability for manifestations of discrimination or hatred in the form of “criticism of sexual practices” and others. As of mid-2018, the Lithuanian LGBT+ organization LGL counted 9 such draft laws.
The typical approach of the parliament to such legislative initiatives was to postpone their consideration regularly; thus, they were not adopted, but were not removed from consideration completely. Thus, not only did they have a chance for the future, but also the very fact of their being considered in the parliament contributed to the strengthening of transhomophobic attitudes in society.
Similar techniques were used in the opposite situation to prevent the adoption of legislation on same-sex partnerships. Thus, the Sejm considered in 2017 a draft law on “cohabitation agreements” – a very limited form of civil partnerships. The draft successfully passed the first reading, but then stalled until the end of the parliamentary session.
The bill on “civil unions”, which was supposed to regulate a more complete, but still a compromise form of civil partnerships, was supported in the first reading in 2022 and in the second in 2023. However, on the last day of the 2024 session, the Social Democratic Party decided to boycott the bill, and it was removed from the agenda. After the elections that were held soon after, conservative parties increased their representation in parliament, and the further fate of civil unions became illusory again – until the decision of the Constitutional Court in 2025, which obliged to recognition and regulation of them.
Although Belarus is politically very close to Russia, it has long refrained from copying the latter’s laws on LGBT+ people and has generally not tried too hard to restrict their rights on a formal level. Apart from this, the state has not been friendly to LGBT+ people, persecuting them in the general course of pressure on dissenters.
Ban on “LGBT propaganda”
In 2016, Belarus passed a law “on the protection of children from information harmful to their health and development,” which, among other things, prohibited the dissemination of information “that discredits the institution of the family and marital relations.” Although this wording did not directly refer to sexual orientation and LGBT+, it indirectly opened up the possibility of treating LGBT+-related information as “harmful” and prohibiting its dissemination.
After the Russian Federation expanded and strengthened the law on “propaganda of non-traditional relations” in 2022, steps towards introducing similar legislation were made in Belarusian governmental circles:
– At the end of 2022, the opinion on the need for a “law against LGBT propaganda” was expressed by the Speaker of the Council of the Republic, Natalia Kochanova.
– In April 2023, deputies proposed to supplement the law on media with a “ban on LGBT propaganda”. Moreover, the Ministry of Information sent a week earlier 500 letters to publishing houses and bookstores, warning of administrative liability if they publish and sell “LGBTQ+ literature”, noting that this would be perceived as a threat to “traditional values of family and society”.
– In June 2023, the Prosecutor General’s Office put forward an initiative proposing, among other things, to establish administrative liability for “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations, sex change, pedophilia, and childfree” – again, similar to Russian legislation. In February 2024, the Prosecutor General’s Office announced that the preparation of the relevant draft law had been completed.
The above-mentioned initiatives have not resulted in any effective legislation by the time of writing. However, restrictions on LGBT+ in Belarusian legislation have nevertheless appeared from another side. In April 2024, the Ministry of Culture, by its resolution, expanded the definition of pornography, adding “homosexualism”, “lesbian love”, “bisexual relations”, “polyamory” to it, along with pedophilia, necrophilia, bestiality, etc., combining all of this under the definition of “non-traditional sexual relations and/or behavior”. Thus, the distribution of LGBT+ related materials in Belarus can now be punished by imprisonment for up to 2 years, or 4, if committed by an organized group, which may include activist LGBT+ associations.
Restrictions on LGBT+ associations
Despite the lack of direct legislative restrictions, LGBT+ organizations have repeatedly been denied official registration under various pretexts. Combined with the 1994 Law on Public Associations, which prohibits the activities of unregistered associations, this greatly limited the opportunities for organized LGBT+ activism. Despite this, it developed, and at the turn of the 2000s and 2010s, several pride events – festivals and even marches, albeit few in number – took place in Minsk. But later, due to increased repression in the form of arrests, attacks, and raids on clubs – by the state itself as well as by traditionalist right-wing radicals with the state’s tacit consent – LGBT+ activity increasingly went underground and online.
Interestingly, Belarusian deputies were developing a draft law on “foreign agents” in 2021, based on similar Russian legislation. However, the authorities abandoned their plans to adopt it in the end, as they were apparently already satisfied with the results of previously developed means of countering foreign information influence. However, the level of censorship, state control, and persecution of the opposition, which makes any public activity extremely difficult, is indeed extremely high in Belarus.
In Ukraine, legislative initiatives directed against LGBT+ people began to emerge soon after Viktor Yanukovych and his associated pro-Russian Party of Regions came to power in 2010. Later, after the Revolution of Dignity and the final choice in favor of a pro-European course, although such initiatives did not completely disappear, their chances of implementation significantly decreased.
Ban on “LGBT propaganda”
The first such draft law was initiated by a group of deputies from all factions of the then Verkhovna Rada – both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian. It was submitted on 20 June 2011 under No. 8711, and the following year, having changed its number to 0945 in the Rada of the next convocation, it passed its first reading in October (and remains the only one that succeeded in this). The draft law provided for amendments to several laws to prohibit the import, production, and distribution of products that “promote homosexualism”, that is, “sexual relations between persons of the same sex”. The punishment provided for a fine of 5,100 hryvnias or imprisonment for a term of 3 to 5 years. However, the bill never had a second reading, and after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, it was withdrawn from consideration – although, according to human rights activists, without following due procedure.
Other homophobic draft laws from the same period:
After the Maidan, when in 2014 Ukraine finally took a course towards European integration, there were no new transhomophobic initiatives at the state level for some time. But when the composition of the Verkhovna Rada changed significantly after the 2019 elections, they soon reappeared. Moreover, behind all such bills was primarily one person – Heorhii Mazurashu, a sports journalist from Bukovyna and a deputy from the Servant of the People party. Mazurashu repeatedly voiced his homophobic position in the media, explaining it with a typical set of clichés: that he is for “traditional family values” and “against parades”, and LGBT+ people “can sleep with whoever they want, just don’t shout that these deviations are the norm, are good”. He also denied the existence of a connection between his draft laws and similar ones in the Russian Federation, despite the fact that their wording was in many ways similar.
At the time of writing, Draft Law No. 6325 has already been withdrawn from consideration, but this happened only in early 2025. Draft Law No. 6327, on the other hand, is the only transhomophobic bill that remains on the Verkhovna Rada’s agenda. However, the expert opinion, according to which it “contradicts international legal obligations in the field of European integration,” makes its final burial only a matter of time, provided that Ukraine maintains the current political course.
It is also worth noting that, in response to Mazurashu’s draft law, Holos MP Inna Sovsun proposed an alternative one No. 6327-1, which would amend anti-discrimination legislation to include sexual orientation and gender identity. However, since the author herself did not promote it, its prospects for adoption are doubtful.
Restrictions on LGBT+ associations
On 16 January 2014, the then Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the majority of which was the pro-Russian Party of Regions, adopted in violation of the rules a package of so-called “laws on dictatorship”, one of which introduced the concept of “public associations that perform the functions of foreign agents”. It covered organizations that received funding from foreign sources and participated in political activities, which were defined by law quite broadly. They had to regularly report on their activities and pay income tax. However, the Verkhovna Rada, under pressure from the Maidan, declared these laws invalid at the end of the month. After the fall of the Yanukovych regime, in order to eliminate ambiguity, the parliament additionally voted to terminate the provisions of these laws.
In Moldova, one of the requirements for visa liberalization with the EU was a ban on discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in employment. This stirred up debate in the political environment and society in general, which activated the conservative opposition, in particular, in promoting homophobic legislative initiatives.
Ban on “LGBT propaganda”
The first noticeable side effect of the political confrontation around LGBT+ issues against the backdrop of European integration was the adoption on 23 February 2012 in the largest city in the northern part of Moldova, Bălți, of a proclamation in support of the Moldovan Orthodox Church, which declared the inadmissibility of “aggressive propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientation.” Ironically, the church was supported in this decision by the Communist Party, which suppressed any religiosity during the Soviet era. Several municipalities and districts followed Bălți’s example soon, introducing a similar ban, and some even designated their territory as a “prohibited zone for homosexual demonstrations.” At the same time, violating the ban did not entail specific liability, and therefore had no legal consequences – these decisions of local authorities played rather a symbolic role in support of homophobic discourse. Subsequently, a significant part of such bans was overturned by the courts.
In April of the following year, the parliament of Gagauzia, an autonomous region of Moldova with a high level of pro-Russian sentiment, adopted a law with the nice title “On ensuring the principles of equality, justice and objectivity.” Along with provisions aimed at combating discrimination, this law also contained a ban on “propaganda of homosexualism, lesbianism, bisexualism, and transgenderism.” In addition, it prohibited the registration of LGBT+ organizations and clubs. A separate article also prohibited same-sex marriage. Less than two months later, these provisions, except for the last one, were also overturned by a court decision.
In May 2013, the Moldovan parliament passed a law banning propaganda, which listed “relationships other than those related to marriage and family” alongside prostitution, pedophilia, and pornography. The law amended the Administrative Code to impose fines for public dissemination of such information and was similar to a law that was being considered by the Russian State Duma at the same time. The vote on the bill was held quietly without any public debate, so its adoption was only announced as a fact. However, since this law contradicted Moldova’s commitments made in the course towards its association with the EU – in particular, the already adopted anti-discrimination law – the question arose quickly among the deputies about the need to correct this mistake. In October, they voted to repeal the amendments on the “ban on propaganda.” It is significant that the communists, together with Orthodox priests, protested against the repeal, so deputies from the parliamentary majority had to enter the parliament building through a back entrance in order to vote.
The next attempt to introduce a “ban on propaganda” into Moldovan law was in 2016. Deputies from the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova, known for its pro-Russian orientation, submitted to parliament a draft law that was again a variation of the Russian one. It aimed to ban “propaganda of homosexual relations among minors” through the media, the Internet, and other means, and provided for fines for violations. However, this time, the bill was withdrawn before even reaching a vote due to sharp criticism from international organizations and pro-European political forces in Moldova itself.
Further transhomophobic legislative initiatives in Moldova are from the period of recent years, namely after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, when, on the one hand, repressions against LGBT+ people in the Russian Federation significantly increased, and on the other hand, it intensified its information operations abroad:
If the pro-European political vector is maintained, transhomophobic bills in Moldova have no chance of being adopted. However, such preservation is not guaranteed: much will be determined by the parliamentary elections to be held in the fall of 2025, where pro-Russian forces will certainly use anti-LGBT+ rhetoric in their electoral campaign.
Transnistria region
The self-proclaimed state of Transnistria, which is an internationally recognized part of Moldova but de facto controlled by Russia, lives under a separate puppet government’s legislation. It was there that Russian initiatives aimed at restricting the rights of LGBT+ people were copied to the greatest extent.
Thus, in 2014, a provision was introduced into the law “On the Protection of Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and Development” prohibiting the dissemination of information that “promotes non-traditional sexual relations” among children. In 2023, in accordance with this law, the distribution of the Walt Disney cartoon Strange World was banned, and cinemas that had already shown it were fined.
2024 was declared the “year of family values” in Transnistria, under the pretext of which the government announced a draft law amending the legislation to prohibit the promotion of “non-traditional sexual relations and (or) preferences, sex change,” as well as pedophilia and refusal to have children. Violations were subject to fines, and for legal entities, suspension of activities for up to 90 days. In April 2025, this law, along with some others aimed at a “ban on promotion of non-traditional values,” was adopted in the first reading by the deputies of the Transnistrian Parliament, and in July, it was finally adopted.
On the one hand, Georgia is quite a religious country, and therefore quite homophobic. On the other hand, after the Rose Revolution of 2003, it embarked on a course of reforms, and soon on approximation with the European Union, which kept it from homophobic initiatives at the legislative level for a while, until the political course changed to a pro-Russian one.
Ban on “LGBT propaganda”
In 2022, the issue of “LGBT propaganda” became topical in the Georgian parliament. Initially, the far-right organization “Alt-Info”, known for its attacks on pride marches in Tbilisi, collected 25,000 signatures and proposed a bill to ban public gatherings held with the aim of “promoting or popularizing propaganda of sexual orientation”. But while it was under consideration, the idea was picked up and developed by the Georgian Dream party, which represented the parliamentary majority. For a long time, it tried to sit on two chairs, making curtseys to the EU with its intentions of European integration, and at the same time, maintaining good relations with Russia. However, as the 2024 elections approached, the pro-Russian orientation of this political force became more and more blatant, and homophobia and transphobia emerged as its manifestations.
In early 2024, deputies announced, and in June put forward, a package bill “On Family Values and the Protection of Minors,” which included the law itself with the corresponding title and 18 amendments to various legislative acts. It provided for:
Thus, this law combined homophobic and transphobic norms that had been gradually introduced in the Russian Federation over the years, and in some aspects even surpassed them. It successfully passed three readings in the parliament controlled by the ruling party. Although President Salome Zurabishvili spoke out against this law, she did not veto it, but only refused to sign it. After that, it was signed by the speaker of the parliament in accordance with the procedure, and at the end of 2024, the law came into force.
Restrictions on LGBT+ associations
Georgian Dream parliamentarians took an example from Russia not only in transhomophobic legislation, but also regarding the so-called “foreign agents”. In 2023, they submitted a related bill, but after large-scale protests, they withdrew it. However, already in April 2024, the party submitted an updated version of the bill entitled “On Transparency of Foreign Influence”, where instead of the term “foreign agent,” the term “organization pursuing the interests of a foreign power” was used. The law stipulated that an organization, media outlet, or broadcasting outlet must register with this status at the prosecutor’s office if at least 20% of its funding comes from foreign sources. Organizations with this status are subject to constant checks by the state and must publicly declare the sources of their funds, and in the absence of registration as a “foreign agent”, a fine or imprisonment for up to 5 years is provided. Although this law does not explicitly concern LGBT+ organizations, it directly affects their activities, as they receive a significant portion of their funding from foreign donors.
The bill was considered amid mass protests, but it passed three readings and was finally adopted, bypassing the presidential veto, in May 2024. It is noteworthy that the authors and supporters called it similar to the American FARA law, although in fact it is much more similar to the Russian one, since the American law requires registration only of organizations that lobby in favor of foreigners. In fact, with the law on foreign agents, the Georgian authorities received additional leverage over a significant part of civil society organizations.
Other restrictions on rights
In 2013, Giorgi Targamadze, who headed the Christian Democratic Movement party he created, proposed during his presidential election campaign to amend the Constitution to define marriage as “the union of a man and a woman.” Since he lost the election, his initiative was not pursued, but the idea was picked up by Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, again from the ruling Georgian Dream party. He presented this as a semblance of a need to avoid “misunderstandings” in relation to the adoption of an anti-discrimination law that also covered sexual orientation, so that it would not be perceived as somehow opening up the possibility of allowing same-sex marriages. One can see a parallel here with how homophobic legislative initiatives also began to develop in Moldova in opposition to the law on combating discrimination on the grounds of SOGI.
Subsequently, the confrontation over the constitutional definition of marriage only intensified. On the one hand, at the end of 2015, the head of the conservative organization “Georgia’s Demographic Society XXI” prepared a draft law with amendments to the Constitution, which were to change the definition of marriage to “the union of a man and a woman”. Then the initiative was again intercepted by Georgian Dream, creating a parliamentary commission in March 2016 to prepare the corresponding amendment. In the summer of the same year, the conservatives collected signatures for a referendum on this issue. On the other hand, LGBT+ activist Giorgi Tatishvili filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court in early 2016, demanding, on the contrary, to remove from the Civil Code the article that defined marriage as the union of a man and a woman. Georgian LGBT+ organizations distanced themselves from his initiative, believing that it only provokes society and thereby harms the community. Ultimately, both initiatives were unsuccessful: the president rejected the idea of a referendum and generally called the issue of the constitutional definition of marriage “a storm in a teacup,” and Tatishvili’s lawsuit was dismissed by the court at the end of the year as inadmissible for consideration.
However, the story did not end there, as another prime minister from the same Georgian Dream party, Giorgi Kvirikashvili, announced an amendment to the Constitution on marriage as one of his election promises if his party had enough seats in parliament after the 2016 elections. This came true – it received 30 more seats and did indeed propose a corresponding bill. Despite not everyone within the parliamentary coalition supporting it, and the president tried to veto it, it was finally adopted in October 2017 and entered into force after the presidential elections the following year.
It is worth noting separately that all transhomophobic legislative novelties in Georgia took place while the previously adopted legislation against discrimination on the grounds of SOGI remained in force. Thus, the Georgian authorities continued to portray themselves as “sitting on two chairs” and pretending that they were not completely abandoning their course towards the EU. However, few people can be fooled by this in recent years.
Despite the generally high level of homophobia, attempts to introduce legislative restrictions on LGBT+ people in Armenia have not been very successful. Moreover, they have mostly been made not really with the direct aim of passing relevant legislation, but rather for the purpose of political flirt with the homophobic electoral majority to win it over to their side.
Ban on “LGBT propaganda”
In 2013, the Armenian police proposed a bill to ban the “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations.” The penalty was a fine, the amount of which increased if such “propaganda” was conducted by a legal entity compared to an individual, and even more if it was conducted through the media. The need for such a law was justified by the support of “traditional values and a stable family,” which non-traditional sexual relations could supposedly affect destructively. In general, the bill resembled the one that had just been adopted in Russia, except that it concerned propaganda not only among minors. However, the police withdrew it in a few days, referring on the identified shortcomings, as well as the fact that this issue was not a priority for them.
In 2018, the topic of “LGBT propaganda” was used by politicians ahead of the parliamentary elections that were held at the end of the year. In particular, Eduard Sharmazanov, the then speaker of parliament and a deputy from the conservative Republican Party, proposed amendments to the law “On the Child’s Rights” to ban “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations” among children. This happened against the background of politicians from different parties competing in rhetoric that portrayed homosexual people as “internal enemies” that they intended to defeat. A month later, the government rejected the bill, explaining that it was unnecessary.
There was another attempt to introduce a bill against “LGBT propaganda” in 2019. This time, it was authored by the Prosperous Armenia party, whose faction proposed it in parliament. The party generally had a pro-Russian orientation, and this bill also resembled the Russian law “against propaganda,” to which its author, Gevorg Petrosyan, referred. It provided for criminal liability for the dissemination of “propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientation” among persons under the age of 16. However, the majority of deputies voted against including the bill on the agenda. The reasons given for this were the vagueness of the concept of “non-traditional orientation” and the fact that the Criminal Code already contains articles on debauchery and pornography, which supposedly eliminate the need for such a separate law.
Other restrictions on rights
Armenia was one of the last countries of the former USSR to abolish a Soviet-era article criminalizing sexual relations between men. In fact, this was done only after the update of the Criminal Code, including the abolition of this article, became one of the requirements for Armenia’s membership in the Council of Europe in 2001. Before that, the article was periodically used to prosecute gay men in the 1990s. Police officers often demanded bribes from them, offering to avoid punishment under this article or reduce its term, and as a payment for not disclosing their sexual orientation.
In 2015, Armenia underwent constitutional reform through a referendum. One of its points was the amendment to the article on marriage, which now stated that a man and a woman who have reached marriageable age have the right to marry and form a family. Human rights activists are divided on whether this wording prohibits same-sex marriages or not. In any case, the rest of Armenia’s legislation does not provide mechanisms for concluding such marriages. At the same time, as the Ministry of Justice stated in 2017, same-sex marriages concluded abroad are recognized in Armenia, although specific cases of such recognition are still unknown.
In addition, Armenian deputies twice – in October 2018 and in November 2019 – made attempts to directly ban same-sex – and in the second case also “transgender” – marriages in the country by introducing such a ban into the Family Code. In both cases, these attempts were associated with the political bloc of the same Prosperous Armenia. And both of them were rejected by the government and parliament, arguing that such changes were not necessary, since Armenian legislation, including the Constitution, does not allow the registration of same-sex marriages, defining them as a “union between a man and a woman” – although, as noted above, there are different opinions on the latter.
Azerbaijan has made little effort to introduce legislative restrictions against LGBT+ people. However, high levels of homophobia combined with a lack of effective means of protection lead to the fact that such people are often persecuted and LGBT+ activism is almost impossible.
Criminal persecution of LGBT+ people
LGBT+ people in Azerbaijan are persecuted by the state even without special legislation. The police purposefully monitor them, maintain databases, and selectively arrest them, accusing them of “disobedience to the police” or “hooliganism.” After that, those detained are blackmailed, sometimes with the use of torture, demanding bribes from them or forcing them to become informants in order to use them to find new LGBT+ people.
The largest case of detention of LGBT+ people occurred in September 2017 in Baku, when the detention of 83 gay and bisexual men and transgender women was officially confirmed, while the actual number may exceed 100. The position voiced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs was that this was supposedly a response to complaints from people who see gay people on the streets, while they “do not fit our nation, our state, our mentality.” The ministry representative directly stated that he has nothing against those who hide their homosexual orientation, but considers it necessary to fight those who flaunt it. Those who tried to earn money through sex work, looking for clients on the street, suffered at most during this raid.
Ban on “LGBT propaganda”
Some politicians have spoken out in favor of introducing such a ban, referring specifically to the example of Russia. Thus, in 2013, after the adoption of a law against “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors” in the Russian Federation, deputy and writer Elmira Akhundova spoke out in support of it and suggested that in the future, such a law could be of use in Azerbaijan. And in 2022, when Russian legislation against LGBT+ became even stricter, another deputy, Javanshir Pashazade, known for his support of “traditional values,” spoke out in favor of banning “LGBT propaganda.” However, these initiatives remained at the rhetoric level, and the relevant bills did not emerge.
Restrictions on LGBT+ associations
Although there are no legislative restrictions for organizations to engage in LGBT+ activities, in fact, such organizations face obstacles both during registration and directly in their work. In general, amendments have been made to the law on the activities of public organizations, with the largest package implemented in 2014, giving the authorities more and more tools to control them:
Given the above difficulties, LGBT+ organizations in Azerbaijan choose to operate without official registration, practically remaining underground. This, in turn, limits their opportunities to obtain funding, as they cannot even open a bank account, while at the same time not eliminating the risk of persecution if homophobic government officials find a pretext for that.
Despite the general transhomophobic atmosphere, legislative initiatives directed against LGBT+ people have repeatedly been successfully countered in Kazakhstan through the efforts of the human rights and activist community, among other means.
Ban on “LGBT propaganda”
There have been several attempts in Kazakhstan to introduce legislation that would ban “propaganda of homosexuality” in one way or another.
Since 2012, the parliament of Kazakhstan, with the support of government agencies, has been developing a draft law that was eventually called “On the Protection of Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and Development.” It, as well as another related law that amended a number of laws, was adopted in early 2015, first by the lower house of parliament and then by the Senate. In general, this law tightened restrictions on the media, in particular, state control over the Internet, complicating the registration procedure for both printed and online publications. Among other things, it banned “propaganda of non-traditional sexual orientation” among children, similar to the Russian law of 2013. However, in May of the same year, the Constitutional Council of Kazakhstan ruled that the bill contradicted the Constitution because it contained wording not clear enough. At the time, Kazakhstan was considered a potential host for the 2022 Winter Olympics, and a number of athletes criticized the homophobic law, calling on the International Olympic Committee to reject Kazakhstan’s bid. This criticism likely influenced the council’s decision (however, the Chinese capital Beijing was ultimately chosen as the host city for the 2022 Winter Olympics).
In July 2018, the Kazakh parliament adopted a similar law on child protection with the same name, which no longer contained references to sexual orientation. However, the Ministry of Information and Communications soon prepared the “Instructions on the Classification of Informational Products” and the “Methodology for Defining Informational Products for Children Harming (Not Harming) Their Health and Development” as by-laws to it. These documents proposed to prohibit the dissemination of information related to the LGBT and gay community among minors, as well as to prohibit access to such information in printed media, social networks, and the Internet. However, thanks to an advocacy campaign conducted by Kazakhstani activists with the involvement of embassies and international organizations, the references to LGBT were removed from the final version of the by-laws.
In 2023, Majilis deputy Ardak Nazarov proposed a legislative ban on “LGBT propaganda” in Kazakhstan, as he believed that this ideology threatened traditions and national values. At that time, his initiative had not received any development. But a year later, in April 2024, deputies from the ruling Amanat party put forward two proposals for amendments to laws containing restrictions for LGBT+. One proposed an amendment to the law “On Mass Media”, which would add “propaganda or promotion of non-traditional sexual orientation” to the list of grounds for stopping publication and distribution in the media. The other proposed changes to the article of the Criminal Code “Incitement of social, national, tribal, racial, class or religious enmity”, adding that it can also occur through “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations”. Thus, the liability for such “propaganda” could constitute a term of up to 7 years in prison. But neither the first nor the second amendment was included in the final edition of the bill, which was put to the vote. At the same time, a provision emerged there on monitoring “harm to the moral development of society and violation of universal, national, cultural and family values”, and in the code “On Marriage (Matrimony) and Family”, there was a provision on “protection, preservation, strengthening and promotion of traditional family values”.
In May 2024, a petition from the State Union of Parents appeared on the state petition portal, which proposed adopting a “law on a complete ban on explicit and implicit LGBT propaganda” following the example of similar laws in the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan. When it received the required 50,000 votes (reportedly under pressure on civil servants to sign it), it was sent to the Ministry of Culture and Information for consideration. As a result of meetings of the ministerial working group, it was decided to partially grant the petition, namely to “protect and isolate adolescents and children from the propaganda and cultivation of sexual relations”, in particular to conduct scientific research on LGBT issues in Kazakhstan for this purpose. Human rights organizations disagreed with this decision and filed a lawsuit to challenge it. At the time of writing, there is no court decision yet, and the aforementioned research has not been completed, so the question of further prospects of this initiative remains open.
Restrictions on LGBT+ associations
Kazakhstan has had a law “On Public Associations” in effect since 1996, which prohibits the creation and operation of associations that “infringe on the health and moral principles of citizens.” This vague wording is used to deny official registration to organizations related to LGBT+ issues. In particular, the queer feminist initiative “Feminita” has repeatedly received such denials. Thus, Kazakhstani LGBT+ organizations are forced to operate as informal associations, which in itself limits their capabilities.
Also in September 2023, the Ministry of Finance created and published a register of individuals and legal entities that receive foreign funding. The list included 240 items, including human rights organizations, public foundations, journalists, etc. At the same time, the selection criteria for inclusion in the register remained unclear, as did the purpose of its creation. However, its very existence allowed state bodies to put additional pressure on public organizations. And in February 2025, deputy Irina Smirnova from the People’s Party of Kazakhstan – the de facto successor to the Soviet Communist Party – proposed in the lower house of parliament a law “on foreign agents.” At the time of writing, this proposal is under consideration, and there is no specific text of such a draft yet.
Other restrictions on rights
It is worth mentioning the transition procedure in Kazakhstan. It has never been liberal here – in particular, it required 30 days of psychiatric assessment to establish a diagnosis of “transsexualism” – but surgery was not previously mandatory. However, with the adoption of new guidelines in 2011, the procedure has become significantly more complicated. In fact, a trans person must appear before a specialized commission three times: first to obtain permission for hormone therapy, then for surgery, and only after that for legal gender recognition. At the first two stages, they can get a refusal, while the last is more formal. In addition, the minimal age at which transition is allowed is 21, and the person must not be married or have “mental or behavioral disorders”. Although activists fought to simplify this procedure and loosen its requirements in subsequent years, they did not succeed.
In Uzbekistan, attempts to decriminalize homosexual sex have not been successful, and the situation of LGBT+ people remains difficult both because of this and because of the general religiously motivated homophobia of society.
Criminal persecution of LGBT+ people
Uzbekistan is one of two countries that, after the collapse of the USSR and the transition to its own Criminal Code, retained punishment for same-sex relations. Moreover, Article 120, which defines it, concerns precisely “satisfaction of a man’s sexual needs with a man without violence” and can be punished by up to 3 years in prison.
The Uzbek authorities have repeatedly refused to abolish the article for “besoqolbozlik (sodomy)”, referring to the “thousand-year-old traditions” of Muslim society. According to data for 2013, about 500 people were convicted under it, and in 2023, 22 criminal cases were opened against 27 men. Not only gay men, but also trans women who have not obtained legal gender recognition and, therefore, are officially considered men, are arrested on charges of “sodomy”. The accused are forcibly subjected to anal examinations, which are supposed to confirm the fact of homosexual relations, and often to HIV tests. There are known cases when AIDS centers passed information about their clients to law enforcement agencies, after which they charged those people under Article 120. In addition, lawyers are afraid to take on the defense of such suspects due to possible negative consequences for their careers.
Ban on “LGBT propaganda”
In 2022, the Information and Mass Communications Agency presented a new draft of the Information Code. Article 45 proposed a ban on posting information on Internet resources that “promotes unnatural relations between persons of the same sex,” and Article 54 proposed the same in the media. At the time of writing, this document is still a draft.
In November 2024, the head of the right-wing nationalist Milliy Tyklanish party, Alisher Qodirov announced the development of a draft law that would ban “LGBT propaganda” in Uzbekistan. According to him, Donald Trump’s daughter, Ivanka, who supported her father’s position against “inappropriate sexual content” and “transgender ideology” in schools, inspired him for this initiative. Thus, Trump’s return to the presidency in the United States has become an additional factor strengthening the positions of ruling conservatives in various countries. So far, this draft law remains at an early stage.
Restrictions on LGBT+ associations
Article 3 of the Law on Public Associations in Uzbekistan prohibits the creation of associations that are aimed at “destruction of society’s ethical foundations” and infringe “the health and morality of the population.” This wording, combined with the high level of homophobia and transphobia, the aforementioned article for “sodomy,” and the government’s general repressive policy against any opposition, makes it impossible for LGBT+ related organizations to operate.
Information about the situation of LGBT+ people in Turkmenistan is fragmentary, as it is a much-closed totalitarian state, where public activity independent from the authorities is almost impossible. However, in general terms, this situation is difficult, due to the presence of penalties for same-sex relations in the legislation as well as to the high level of repression in the country generally, including on the grounds of SOGI.
Criminal persecution of LGBT+ people
Turkmenistan is another former Soviet country that has retained an article on “sodomy” in its Criminal Code. In fact, this article was even more detailed in the code adopted in 1997 to replace the Soviet one, and the maximum penalty it provided was 2 years in prison. Moreover, despite the authorities’ statements that they would consider abolishing this article, subsequent changes have only made the punishment harsher. Thus, with the 2019 amendments, a term of up to 2 years in prison and up to 5 years of living in a certain place could be obtained for “sexual intercourse between men” as such, without aggravating circumstances. “Sodomy with the use of physical violence” could lead to up to 6 years in prison (in the 2022 version, this was increased to 8); committed repeatedly, by a group, against a minor, or if it resulted in infection with a venereal disease – up to 10 years; committed against a child under 14 or with the intent to cause serious harm – up to 20 years.
For some time, the article on “sodomy” was almost never applied until the new president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, came to power in 2007. Since then, the police have become more active in monitoring gay men, persecuting and arresting them. Those who manage to pay a ransom are released. Others are charged and subjected to forensic medical examinations, which include anal examinations, and then tortured while inquiring about the names of other gay men. In 2021, about 30 men were held in this way in one of the police detention centers. Torture also occurs in prisons, where those convicted of “sodomy” are kept separately from other prisoners, and, according to one victim of such “justice,” everyone goes out HIV-positive from there. In some cases, an alternative to arrests is also conversion therapy, since society generally perceives homosexuality as a mental illness.
Restrictions on LGBT+ association
There are no LGBT+ organizations in Turkmenistan as such, and the activities of international human rights organizations are very limited. They can do practically nothing without coordination with state representatives, and LGBT+ people avoid turning to them for help, fearing of revealing their sexual orientation. The prospects for changing this situation for the better are not visible today and are hardly possible without changing the political regime.
Kyrgyzstan has long had a reputation as the most democratic country in the Central Asian region; therefore, the LGBT+ movement has felt relatively free there. However, the situation has since taken a turn for the worse, especially since 2020, when a conservative, authoritarian-leaning president came to power.
Ban on “LGBT propaganda”
In March 2014, two deputies from different parties submitted a draft law to the parliament of Kyrgyzstan to ban the dissemination of information in the media that forms a “positive attitude towards non-traditional sexual relations” and to restrict peaceful assemblies with a similar purpose. Examples of such relations were “sodomy and lesbianism”. One of the authors of this draft law, Kurmanbek Dyikanbayev, recalled in an interview that “this issue was raised in Russia before the Olympics” (2014), and that the law does not apply to what adults do with each other, but is only needed “for such relations cannot influence the development of a child’s worldview”. However, the text itself did not say that it only applies to “propaganda among children”. It also provided for harsher penalties compared to a similar Russian law – not only a fine, but also up to a year in prison.
The authors soon withdrew their draft law – but only to return it together with another co-author in May of the same year, with a more detailed explanation of the wording “forming a positive attitude towards non-traditional sexual relations”. The punishment for such “forming” ranged from a fine to, as in the previous version, a year in prison. In October, the draft law was adopted in first reading, after which amendments and clarifications were made to it – in particular, “non-traditional sexual relations” were clearly defined as “sexual attraction between persons of the same sex and sexual relations between them”. In June 2015, the draft law was just as successfully supported in its second reading by an overwhelming majority of deputies. A third reading was expected in early 2016, but it was postponed, and the draft law was never returned to.
In 2021, the President of Kyrgyzstan Sadyr Zhaparov issued a decree “On the spiritual and moral development and physical education of the individual,” which referred, in particular, to “the priority of spiritual and moral motives of life behavior over material interests,” and state bodies were to ensure “breeding in the education system of traditional cultural, spiritual, moral and family values.” Although the text did not contain anything directly related to SOGI, these formulations already set the direction for further restrictions on the rights and freedoms of LGBT+ people.
And in March 2023, deputy Jamilya Isayeva from the parliamentary majority party associated with the president submitted to parliament a draft law in this direction with amendments to a number of laws, in particular, to the law “On measures to prevent harm to children’s health, their physical, intellectual, mental, spiritual and moral development in the Kyrgyz Republic.” They were supposed to expand the definition of information harmful to the health and development of children to include information that “rejects family values, promotes non-traditional sexual relations, and develops disrespect for parents or other family members.” Such information was prohibited from being distributed in educational, cultural, and healthcare institutions, within 200 meters of them, as well as in the media and on the Internet. In addition, any video identified as harmful to children was to be appropriately labeled, and printed materials were to be physically inaccessible to children. Fines of up to 5,000 soms for individuals and up to 25,000 soms for legal entities were provided for as punishment. In June 2023, the law was finally adopted, and in August, it was signed by the president and entered into force. Experts noted the haste with its adoption, which led to overly vague wording, contradictions with the rest of Kyrgyzstan’s legislation and international obligations, and, at the same time, similarities with Russian legislation against “LGBT propaganda.”
Restrictions on LGBT+ association
As for the activities of public LGBT+ organizations, they have already faced problems in Kyrgyzstan before. For example, in 2011, the Ministry of Justice refused to register an organization due to the presence of the words “gays” and “lesbians” in its full name, because this allegedly “contributes to the corruption of moral norms and national traditions of the Kyrgyz people,” even though such restrictions were not specified in the legislation. At the same time, some LGBT+ organizations have been officially operating in the country since the 2000s.
Later, the Kyrgyz authorities adopted the Russian approach to the legislation on “foreign agents.” Such a bill was first proposed in November 2022, and then again with some changes in May 2023. In March 2024, the parliament finally approved it, and the president soon signed it. This law, introducing a number of amendments to the legislation of Kyrgyzstan, provided for:
This has significantly complicated the work of LGBT+ organizations supported mostly by foreign funding.
Other restrictions on rights
The worsening situation also affected transgender people, although, on the contrary, changes for the better were taking place before. Thus, in 2017, a procedure was introduced based on the WPATH Standards of Care for Transgender People, 7th version, which allowed for legal gender recognition, in fact, based on a medical diagnosis according to ICD-10, and the scope of medical interventions was determined individually.
However, in 2020, without any warning or public discussion, an amendment was made to the Civil Code of Kyrgyzstan, which excluded the possibility of changing a birth certificate based on a medical document on sex change, as it was before. After that, although the medical part of the transition remained available, changing identity documents became possible only by court decision.
In November 2024, the Ministry of Health proposed a new regulation on the medical assessment of transgender people, which directly noted the importance of changing documents for them. However, at the time of writing, it remains a draft.
The situation of LGBT+ people in Tajikistan is similar to that in Azerbaijan: there is no legislation clearly directed against them, but the level of homophobia in society is high, and this results in persecution, including by the state.
Criminal persecution of LGBT+ people
Although Tajikistan decriminalized same-sex sexual acts in 1998, police continue to persecute gay men. The argument for detention is often that they are at risk of contracting HIV. The Criminal Code of Tajikistan provides for up to 5 years in prison for knowingly transmitting HIV to someone. So the police force gay men to take tests, and charge them under this article if they test positive, often demanding bribes to have the charges dropped.
In June 2014, police conducted raids across Tajikistan with the aim, according to Interior Minister Ramazon Rahimzoda, of “disclosure of people involved in prostitution, pimping, and running brothels.” A total of 505 people were detained, including LGBT+ people. Later, the ministry explicitly stated that the fight against such crimes should also include the fight against “homosexuality and lesbianism.” In October 2017, a ministry representative stated that a working group established the previous year as a result of operations “Morality” and “Purge” had entered the data of 319 gay men and 48 lesbians into a special register, which determines the need for them to undergo tests to avoid the spread of sexually transmitted diseases – despite the fact that no law provides for such a register. In 2022–2023, the police conducted raids specifically against LGBT+ people, forcing them to undergo HIV tests. The arrests of 10 gay men on suspicion of infecting 86 people were officially recognized.
Restrictions on LGBT+ association
In a context where LGBT+ people are persecuted as such, there are no officially registered LGBT+ organizations in Tajikistan. In particular, the organization Rohi Zindagi worked with key populations for years, but after starting an SOGI-related project, it faced strong pressure. As a result, after frequent strict inspections for six months in 2017, the organization’s leadership decided to close it. In addition, legislative amendments were successively adopted in Tajikistan that restricted the activities of public organizations:
Given all of the above, LGBT+ organizations in Tajikistan currently operate only in the form of unofficial initiative groups.
At the same time, Tajikistan adopted its first anti-discrimination law in 2022. However, it lacks the SOGI grounds, and its presence has had no impact on the situation of LGBT+ people.
Now, after reviewing the situation in individual countries, we can make some generalizations.
On the one hand, there is no clear pattern that the political proximity of certain countries also determines the proximity of their approaches to the rights of LGBT+ people at the state level. E.g., Belarus is a political satellite of Russia and follows it in many matters, but it has long avoided reproducing Russian homophobic legislative initiatives, preferring rather informal methods of pressure on the LGBT+ community.
At the same time, in those countries where such legislative initiatives arose, they most often relied on the experience of either the Russian Federation or other countries with their institutional manifestations of homophobia:
Another factor that led to the emergence of transhomophobic initiatives we can call the aggravation of socio-political contradictions. It arose when, on the one hand, the country carried out reforms aimed at improving the observance of human rights, and so the LGBT+ community became more visible and audible. On the other hand, this caused resistance from the conservative part of society, prompting opposition from those politicians who are oriented towards it. We can mention the following cases here:
We can see that such confrontations in society often arose against the background of consideration of draft laws, the adoption of which was a requirement of the EU. Conservative politicians use this in their propagandist rhetoric, presenting such initiatives as imposed by the West in contradiction to the “traditional values” of the country. However, the EU’s demands in such cases coincide with the demands of the country’s LGBT+ community, moreover, of the general community of people who think progressively and strive for equal rights for everyone. European demands only become a kind of amplifier for them, while the strong resistance to them indicates rather that they are evolutionary ahead of the development of the mainstream society and the politics oriented towards it, not yet ready to accept such equality. At the same time, conservatives presenting their position as opposed to Western influence and based purely on local traditions are also not sincere in this. After all, we can see that their legislative initiatives are also not free from influence from other countries – either from the Russian Federation as a regional leader, or from the same West, rather the conservative part of its political spectrum.
In some cases, the second, or even the main goal of politicians promoting transhomophobic bills was to increase their rating among the electorate with an orientation towards the conservative majority – either within the specific election campaign, or in general. Individual politicians in Georgia and Armenia were guided by such motives. And such figures as Vitaly Milonov and Elena Mizulina in Russia, Petras Gražulis in Lithuania, and Heorhii Mazurashu in Ukraine are already firmly associated primarily with homophobia, making it part of their political image consciously or not. Such political motives, however, are not specific to post-Soviet countries – similar examples can be found all over the world.
Two “waves” have already been mentioned above. The strengthening of institutional homophobia and its consolidation in new legislative initiatives of the Russian Federation after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is not a simple coincidence. Having moved from a hybrid war to its open, pervasive phase, the Russian state has finally thrown off its mask, opposing itself to the civilized world, in which the rule of law, democracy, and human rights are important. If earlier Russia still tried to broadcast at least to the West the image of a generally democratic state, albeit with its own “peculiarities,” now the need for this has completely disappeared. So, the most vulnerable and marginalized social groups, including LGBT+ people, were first to fall under the wheel of the authoritarian machine that is gaining momentum.
Countries and regions that have either directly become allies of the Russian Federation or are somehow closer to its orbit have tried to follow a similar path after 2022:
At the same time, pro-European countries that support Ukraine in the war have made moves in the opposite direction during the same period:
In addition, those were pro-Russian political forces in Moldova that proposed bills “against propaganda” starting in 2022, while pro-European ones, with a majority in power, have not allowed their adoption. As for Armenia, after Russia effectively betrayed it by not supporting it in the Second Karabakh War of 2020 and the subsequent stages of the confrontation with Azerbaijan, despite being in the same military bloc of the CSTO, it also began to make curtsies towards the EU. You may or may not consider this a coincidence, but there were no transhomophobic legislative initiatives in Armenia during this period.
Countries with authoritarian regimes under the influence of Islam – Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan – stand somewhat separately. Dictators and political forces associated with them, who are often in power for life, do not need to encourage voters, as well as to follow the European example. And we almost do not see new legislative initiatives directed against LGBT+ people in these countries, but this does not make their situation any better. They are subject to criminal prosecution regardless of whether the country has special legislation (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) or not, but the police find grounds for it, referring to other articles of the Criminal Code (Azerbaijan, Tajikistan). Also, in these countries, the activities of LGBT+ organizations are practically impossible both because of the risk of homophobic persecution and because of the generally strict conditions for public associations, when representatives of the authorities can refuse registration, impose fines, and cease operations at their own discretion.
Finally, let’s look at those cases where restrictive initiatives were directed against transgender people. In one form or another – taking into account both implemented and only proposed restrictions – they appeared in such countries as the Russian Federation, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, self-proclaimed Transnistria, Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. If we look at them in more detail:
In terms of time, we see again how 2022 becomes a kind of dividing line. Before it, there were separate, unrelated transphobic initiatives (Lithuania, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan), while the later ones represent a system where the Russian Federation is their main source, while others are oriented towards it. At the same time, it is exactly where the government has a pro-Russian orientation that such initiatives have become successful: in Georgia, in the Transnistria region, and it will most likely be a matter of time in Belarus. In Ukraine and Moldova, provided that the pro-European course is maintained, it will also be a matter of time before transphobic draft laws are finally eliminated.
The common experience of the Soviet past influences how the countries of the former USSR treat LGBT+ people and their human rights, including the legislative regulation of these rights. However, more determinant for this treatment is how these countries see their future. Those that seek to preserve and strengthen their authoritarian system, taking Russia’s example here and there, resort to the oppression of LGBT+ people as part of their policies. And those that have chosen a course for democratization and unification with the progressive countries of Europe in their system of values, in a general sense or, more specifically, in joining the European Union, are gradually improving the legal status of LGBT+ people.
The full-scale phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war further strengthened and exacerbated this difference, showing who is who. After all, this war has become more than just an attempt by Russia to take back what it used to consider its own. This is a civilizational confrontation in which the world of the past, based on the “law of power”, is trying to take revenge on the world of the future, where the “power of law” is at the core. One way or another, it pushes various political forces in different countries to take a side in this war. And those who sided with Russia are more willing to follow its example also in repressive practices towards LGBT+ people, introducing laws against “propaganda” and prohibiting transition.
The further strengthening of authoritarian regimes in the region, primarily the Russian one, and their achievement of new political and military victories will obviously lead to a deterioration in the situation of LGBT+ people in the legal sphere and in general. The consequence of this may be new restrictions on public LGBT+ related activities as well as increased persecution of LGBT+ people by the police, and possibly a return to criminal liability for same-sex relations in some countries. The democratic community must actively counteract this, and in the current realities, not only in the political sphere, but also physically with weapons in hand. When the progressive civilizational project of the future, with human rights as an integral part, which might have seemed non-alternative at the beginning of the new millennium, must instead fight to prevent a return to the dark past, the slogan “rights are not given, rights are taken” takes on an increasingly literal meaning.
Data from the ILGA World Database, Rainbow Map, Trans Rights Index & Map, and other projects were used in preparation of this material.
Author: Inna Iryskina, analytical manager of Insight NGO
August 2025